

18 November 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Laurence Silberman, Chairman,  
and Other Members of the CIA Transition  
Team

SUBJECT : Historical Background and Documentary  
Material of Potential Utility

I. Previous Transitions

1. None of the seven previous DCI/CIA "transitions" with which I am personally familiar was or is directly analogous to the transition we have been asked to facilitate. Nonetheless, they may contain some lessons we can profitably use. The transitions in question are:

(a) Dulles to McCone in November of 1961 (after a decent interval had lapsed following the Bay of Pigs). This transition occurred fairly quickly during the course of President Kennedy's first term, not during or coincident with a change in administration.

(b) McCone to Raborn, in the summer of 1965. This shift also occurred fairly quickly during the middle of a presidential term (Johnson's), not at one's outset.

(c) Raborn to Helms in August/September of 1966. Again, there was no presidential shift simultaneously occurring. Furthermore, in this instance, little "transitional" work was needed since Helms had already been effectively running the Agency for some time and did not even need to move his office. (He kept what had been the DDCI's office, which he had occupied, and simply made it the DCI's office).

(d) Helms to Schlesinger in February of 1973. This move was made quite quickly, shortly after President Nixon's second inauguration but not when an administration was changing.

(e) Schlesinger to Colby in the late spring of 1973. This was another quick move made during the course of a presidential term (Nixon). It also had its unique features. Schlesinger was moved quite quickly to the Defense Department after the firing of Archibald Cox and shift of Elliot Richardson. Colby was a life-long professional who, prior to becoming DCI, was already the Agency's Executive Director-Comptroller (then the number three position). There was little formal transition, though things were made more than a trifle complicated by the fact that Schlesinger left in (if I remember correctly) May, President Nixon named Colby as the designated successor almost immediately, but he was not confirmed by the Senate until the day before the latter went into recess that summer, and then (for some reason) he was not sworn in for several weeks after that. As a result, Colby did not actually assume the office until September of 1973. This was quite a delicate period (which I remember vividly since I was on the Agency's Executive/Management Committee at the time). Dick Walters (the DDCI) was technically Acting Director after Schlesinger left and until Colby formally took office. Bill was technically Walters' subordinate, but was known to be the DCI-designate. Most fortunately, all involved -- particularly both Dick and Bill -- were consummate professionals and gentlemen. As a result, a situation which could easily have proved impossible was not, and actually worked rather well.

(e) Colby to Bush in mid-1975. Once again, this move did not precisely coincide with a shift in presidential administration, though it did come fairly soon after Vice President Ford moved into the Oval Office as President Ford. This transition (in which I was quite heavily involved) also occurred rather quickly and under forced draft.

(f) Bush to Turner in 1977. This is the closest parallel, but it too had its unique features. George Bush left the office of the DCI on 20 January 1977. Turner was not named until some time later (after the Sorensen quadrille) and did not take office until around the end of March or early April. During this interim period, Hank Knoche, the DDCI, bridged the gap by serving as Acting Director.

## II. Information Requested and Being Obtained

2. I happen to know, and am privileged to count as friends, all living former DCIs. I have contacted all of them and am in the process of seeing or talking to each. Recognizing the unique features of each one's own "transition", I am asking each one the following three questions:

(a) What materials/analyses/briefings/etc. did he find most useful to him as he assumed the DCI's office.

(b) What such materials did he find of minimal use, even though their preparation might have seemed (in the abstract) a good idea at the time.

(c) In retrospect, what might have been done or prepared to support him in taking over the DCI's office that was not done or prepared and which would have helped had it been.

Some interesting answers have already begun to emerge from these queries, as summarized below. We will, I think, find the individual answers of considerable interest; but will probably find any patterns emerging from the totality of these answers even more potentially significant.

## III. Documents We Should Obtain

3. In addition to touching base with all living former DCIs, I have also talked with Hank Knoche (who bridged the gap between Bush and Turner) and with Leo Cherne (the last Chairman of the PFIAB). From these gentlemen, I have learned of the following documents which I think we should take steps as quickly as possible to obtain:

(a) Hank tells me that a rather extensive file of briefing materials was prepared to facilitate the post-Bush transition. We can ask for these from the Agency. From other private soundings, I know where at least one set exists and could be obtained; but I would much prefer to acquire them openly, for obvious reasons. The outgoing (Ford) PFIAB prepared several studies to facilitate the Carter transition. Of particular interest will be a PFIAB-commissioned memorandum entitled "Intelligence for the Future". Actually, we are looking for three sets of documents: (1) an unclassified notebook prepared for the incoming President;

(2) a classified notebook assembled for similar purposes; and (3) a PFIAB report to the incoming President.

Leo told me that Lionel Ulmer (now with Motorola) had been the PFIAB staff man on this exercise. Lionel tells me that these documents are now in the Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) files in the custody of a gentleman by the name of James Dick, whose telephone number is

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#### IV. Other Useful Documents

4. In addition to the materials outlined above, there is another set of documents we should get hold of. These pertain to the DCI's budgetary responsibilities and authorities, and will be germane to our deliberations regardless of where we may individually or collectively come out on the "structural reorganization" issue (the topic of a separate memorandum). These documents are: (1) the "Taylor Report", done in 1974 (to the best of my recollection), about which I have already spoken to Mark; (2) the 1971 letter from President Nixon to Dick Helms (which my current office suite-mate Jim Schlesinger drafted); (3) the addendum to the Schlesinger letter given to President Ford to (I think) DCI Bush (possibly Colby); and (4) the additional budgetary authorities and responsibilities levied on DCI Turner by President Carter.

#### V. Further Action In Train or Suggested

5. I am preparing a separate memorandum on the responses given to my queries by former DCIs. Also, Mr. McCone has told me that he will be in New York on Friday, 21 November, and will be happy to come to Washington to talk with our transition group and/or its Chairman. Not being able to get hold of our Chairman, I naturally did not extend any such invitation; but I do think it would be useful for us to talk with McCone since he had a number of concrete, practical suggestions and experience-based observations I believe we would all find enlightening.

George A. Carver, Jr.

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